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Tools and Institutions of Interregional Convergence: the case of Russian Federal Policy 
 
This work is executed within the framework of the cycle of the studies, 
undertaken after the assertion of the federal target program “Reduction of differences in 
the social and economic development of the regions of Russian Federation”. 
The basic purpose of this research is to study the existing regional political and 
economic institutions, and their role in decreasing the gap between the average and 
given level of the economic and social indicators.  
 
1. Methodological approach of the study and the necessity of 
reinterpretation of old regional concepts  
 
The task of the deep integration of political and economic sciences in Russian 
regional studies thus far remains unrealized. One of the priority directions for its solution 
is the study of the economic behavior of regional authority, which never earlier in the 
Soviet regional science was the object of analysis.  It is necessary to recognize the 
personified nature of the contemporary regional development of Russia. In the world of 
non-zero transaction costs the distribution of political authority (executive, legislative, 
judicial), the personality of political leader and the quality of institututions, created by 
regional authority, do have economic value.  
In the transitional economy with its gigantic expenses of contracting in view of 
significant uncertainty, widespread opportunism (nonobservance of the contract 
conditions) of the majority of participants, authority can play the determining role in the 
regional development even with the fact that its economic behavior is shaped under the 
conditions for the exogenous assigned limitations, e.g. federal standards, rules and the 
framework.  
The economic behavior of authority is the same complex phenomenon of 
regional development, which exerts direct and indirect influence on all social and 
economic processes of territory as the budgetary flows. However, the second 
phenomenon in view of the presence of the branched budgetary statistics is studied 
today considerably more complete. As shows experience of ten years of Russian 
reform, regional authority, playing the role of the active coordinator of basic economic 
processes in the region, is capable of considerably decreasing the information 
asymmetry (uncertainty) to form the clear and specific signals for the participants of the  
regional economy.  
From the other side, there are the numerous examples, when the intentional 
maintenance of information uncertainty, the domination of nonformal standards and 
rules in the economic behavior of regional authority destroy the long-term oriented 
economic activity.  
Another direction of efforts in realizing of the synthesis of the political and 
economic factors in regional development consists in the reinterpretation of old 
conceptual apparatus, procedure and methodology, entire problems of regional science 
(economic geography and regional economy). And if with the economic factors in the 
Soviet science significant reserves were created, with the political the situation is much 
more complicated.  There were no fundamental works on the political development of 
the regions of the USSR.  
And only now methodology, conceptual apparatus for regional political and 
economic experiments are formed. Traditional concepts of the Soviet regional science - 
geographic position, industrial center, territorial and productive complex, territorial 
structure of economy  - under the new conditions changed their nature, but as before 
reflect objective laws governing the t erritorial development and can be analyzed by 
micro-economic tools.  Contract understood territorial problem acquires more than colors, since it 
reflects no longer only processes of technological, production gravity, but also economic 
interests of wider than earlier agents (regional authority, non-governmental 
organizations, the integrated business- structures), the concrete schemes of the rights 
of the property, the role of transaction costs in the determination of its structural shell. 
For example, if territorial and productive complex, industrial center was understood 
earlier as the localized predominantly technological combination of the economic cells, 
control by which is accomplished along the departmental channels, then now  - it is 
substantially wider as the financial, organizational and technological vertical and 
horizontal integration of the individual economic subjects, scientific and educational 
establishments, and combined with the structures of civil society.  
Role of regional authority is to coordinate this process for decreasing the trans-
action costs of interaction. In the Soviet time the method of division into districts was 
leading in the economic geography. With its aid the areas of the action of planned 
norms were established determining uniform cells for administrative control and 
producing the regional state policy. Its exceptional popularity at that time was based on 
the long-standing stability of the social and economic parameters of the national and 
regional economy.  
The micro-economic analysis of the phenomena of regional development will 
claim this method, also, under the new market conditions, when the social and 
economic parameters of regional development change considerably more dynamically 
than it is earlier, as the tool of the space detachment of uniform economic institutions  
for the determination of the boundaries of the action of one type contracts in the forest, 
the petroleum, the gas, agrarian and other resource chains.  
In the Soviet time economic geographic position (EGP) w as understood as 
economic and infrastructural phenomenon, in the essence the materialized relation, 
object; the factor of the formation of the economic connections/communications of 
Soviet enterprises. Now EGP becomes political and economic category, beam of the 
absolute and residual rights of control after the communications of territory and transit 
channels of transport, i.e., political and simultaneously economic institution.  
EGP is examined in the context of the schemes of the rights of property 
prevailing in the region. And as the contract problem of the relations of region with the 
basic neighbors. In the economy of many regions of Russia today there is the main 
contract, which renders system influence on the stability of its functioning, stability of 
economic complex and social sphere. As a rule, this contract determines the conditions 
for interaction of local infrastructural monopoly (department of railroad, AO-energy, or 
Gazprom) and the basic users of its services in the region. 
The multi-aspect study of this contract and basic conflicts, which appear between 
its participants, in whom the key special features of nature of regional economy are 
manifested, is exceptionally important for purposes of institutional analysis. 
The task of the geographical  review of all-Union and regional planned norms 
from the point of view of their correspondence to the social and economic conditions of 
concrete territories was set in the Soviet time before the regional science. In the 
institutional approach this problem i s treated as the study of regional specific 
institutions, first of all standards and the rules of inter-firm coordination.  
 
2. Regional authority as the object of the regional economic analysis  
 
The economic behavior of regional authority structures the cooperation of political 
and economic institutions and results in the united political and economic process of 
regional development. Primary attention is paid to its role in the determination of the 
schemes of property and concrete forms of the contract device of the main resource chains, generated in the region.The authorities of any region are always forced to solve 
several fundamental problems: decrease of information uncertainty and transaction 
costs; agency cost problem; the optimization of the schemes of the property rights.The 
number of solutions of these problems is limited.  
As a rule, authorities select the compromise outcomes, which are located 
between the maximum poles. That are instructive the cases, when the policy of regional 
authority falls under the category of marginal case, in which compromises are rejected 
and all its characteristic attributes vividly are manifested.  
Regional authority and the problem of economic coordination. Force of authority - 
this is the ability to resolve contract c onflicts between the basic players of regional 
economy, to establish the mutually acceptable rules of game for them - formal and/or 
nonformal standards and the framework of behavior.  
Regional authority and transaction costs. Regional transaction costs - this is the 
expenditure of time, energy, information, financial and natural resources to coordinate 
the economic activity between the basic economic subjects inside the regional 
economy.The physical expression of the most essential part of the regional transaction 
costs consists of the losses in the volumes of the obtained in the region natural 
resources in the process of their displacement over the resource chains from the places 
of output to the processing and the sale inside the region due to the natural losses, the 
withdrawal into the “shadow”, the delays in movement etc. 
Regional development is effective, when it contributes to reduction in the trans-
action costs. In the limit the resetting to zero of transaction costs ensures self-execution 
of the contracts concluded inside the region, automatism of the functioning of the entire 
regional economy.  
The role of regional authority lies in the fact that to lower transaction costs to 
such an extent as to lead to the situation of its further nonintervention into the regional 
economy. Then the problem of economic coordination will be solved by market, price 
mechanism.  
However, in the indeterminate medium of the transitional economy in view of the 
weak work of market coordination the interference of regional authority in the processes 
of economic coordination is necessary. Regional authority comes forward as the agent 
of reduction in the regional transaction costs under the conditions for the exogenous 
assigned limitations. When it does not manage this mission, it cannot deal with an 
increase in the expenses of the contracting, on the elections it is changed by another, 
“corporate structure” of which proves to be more adequate to the specific character of 
regional economy. Elections make it possible to accomplish a passage from one model 
of corporate structure of regional authority to another. Changes in the structure of 
regional authority lead to molding of the new principles of interaction between the 
economic agents, to the new schemes of the arrangement of resources. 
Regional authority solves the problems of the coordination of basic economic 
agents by different tools: by federal target programs, by agreements with the basic 
enterprises, infrastructural monopolies, etc. Regional authority at the stage of the 
reformation of natural monopolies is capable of becoming the agent of integrated inter-
firm interactions, of creating as a result of its economic activism the integrated 
structures from the fragments of natural monopolies and local economic subjects.  
In the Western countries the authority plays the different role. It limits vertical 
contracts, fighting with the monopoly. Here, it organizes the vertical contracting of 
subsidaries in the stage of the reformation of natural monopolies. 
Regional authority and the problem of agency costs. Within entire variety of the 
versions of this problem there are only three cases. First, principal can organize the 
competition of managers and their frequent rotation. Second, the key posts of the 
control of resource chains can be set to the nearest relatives, e.g. people, to which the regional leader undoubtedly entrusts. Third, principal can serve the basic frames of the 
regional structure of authority.  
Relations with the local self-government entities is  one of the faces of t he 
problem of agency costs. And again here each regional leader has several versions of 
the solutions. The first, taken today in many national republics, consist of the 
suppression of democracy in various forms.The second, the encouragement of capital 
municipal formation by special transfers from the regional budget for the fulfillment of 
capital functions and simultaneously the stringent requirements of transparency in the 
budget relations.The third solution, probably, consists of controlled democracy  - the 
encouragement of the acceptable for the regional authority forms of local self-guidance. 
Regional authority as quasi-corporation. There is a correspondence between 
corporate structure of the authority, which can be to a certain degree compared with the 
forms of the organization of business (individual possession, closed type joint-stock 
company or open type joint-stock company), and ratio of nonformal and formal 
standards and rules, “manufactured” by authority.  
Dynamic relationship of formal and nonformal standards and rules in the main 
branches of regional economy, generated by regional authority, is the important 
indicator of its economic behavior. Depending on the domination of formal or nonformal 
standards in the economic behavior regional authority is separated on rule-based or 
discretion-based model.  
In the republic of Tyva and Mordovia the model of the organization of authority is 
closed type joint-stock company and therefore there predominate nonformal standards 
and rules. From other side, in the Kemerovskaya province the authority is constructed 
according to the type of the open joint-stock company and that here formal standards 
and rules prevail.  
The arrival into the region of the integrated business-groups forces regional 
authorities to transform institutional matrix to the side of formal standards and rules. In 
this case the rigidity of regional authorities leads to their regular replacement on the 
elections to others, whose institutional matrix is more adequate to the formed corporate 
structure.  
Regional authority and the search for rent. Rent behavior are the intentional 
shortening of resource chains, the decrease of the maximum depth of processing for 
rapid resource realization on the external markets. Under these conditions inter-firm 
disbalances both in the territorial and in the branch aspects has regular nature because 
only supporting political and economic fragmentation authority can not spend the 
obtained economic rent. Otherwise they will have to adjust its redistribution and thus 
decrease its appropriated portion. With the decrease of fragmentation looking for rent 
could not be so successful.  
Regional authority regularly attempts by different tools to grasp rent from the 
resources and locations and shapes the regional institutions in regard to this forms. The 
search for rent by strong regional authority is capable to regulate and to structure of the 
regional institutions. On the other side, the search for rent by weak authority, on the 
contrary, provokes the conflicts of its branches and the rapid development of nonformal 
standards and rules, on which it is appropriated by shady structures. 
Example of the Kurils Islands. In the last decade on the islands were formed two 
political and economic models, as the generator of each of which protrude the unique 
properties of sea biological resources.The first, northern, it is extended in the North- 
Kurils and Kurils regions. It is based on the operation of deep-sea biological resources 
not extremely profitable. The investment activity of firms is oriented to middle- and the 
long-term purposes, and imperative requirements for the municipal, provincial and 
federal authority consist of the guarantee of stable rules of game on the fish market  The southern model of looking for rent is extended in the Southern Kurils region. 
It is based on the rapid, to a considerable degree of illegal activity, oriented for the 
Japanese market for fresh seafood produced by small enterprises 
The destructive action of southern model on the local economy confirms the 
dynamics of basic social and economic indicators in the last decade: Southern Kurils 
region now lost its economic position. The vicious circle appeares: shadow economy 
renderes the effect on local political system, converting authority into the decoration, 
since the business community is not experienced the need for the establishment of strict 
rules of game.  
 
3. National-economic balance against the the intra-regional 
 
In each large region of Russia the task of local inter-firm coordination exists now. 
In the Soviet time regions solved national problems, their enterprises participated in the 
inner-union division of labor, but very weakly worked on the harmony of the 
development of their own regional economy.The industry of many fields and republics 
was created as extra-regional, in no way connected with the territory of position - which 
was used in the essence as the transit area with factors of production flowing in and 
final production flowing out.  
Today inter-firm gaps and seams lead to the loss of the taxation base for the 
regions, the draining of financial resources and other problems.The problem of the intra-
regional “closing” of the activity of the major enterprises (but, naturally, not to complete 
autarky) sharply stands for many Russian regions. The way of each of them to the intra-
regional economic integration is specific. For many subjects of the Russian federation 
(Volga Region, the Urals, Western Siberia), in which the primary location of industrial 
enterprises dated back to the war years, now it is necessary to solve the problems of 
the intra-regional integration of old industrial enterprises with the new, the already local, 
suppliers of the factors of production (natural, technological, intellectual 
resources/lifetimes. On achievement of intra-regional balance the following task 
consists of import-substitution and export-expansion.   
 
4. Cost of quality measurement as the factor of contract changes 
 
The expenses of measurement render systematic influence on the structure of 
contracts and organization of the markets: when the expenses of measurement grow, 
the economic forces of competition come into action in the direction of the new versions 
of economic organization, with which the expenses of measurement (transaction costs) 
will be reduced.  
The functioning of resource chains in the regions of Russia is combined with the 
significant losses of participants in the contracts in view of their insufficient isolation 
according to the qualitative characteristics. In those chains, in which new institutional 
formulation at the federal and regional level is achieved rapidly, the need for the 
contract and according to the schemes of rights property the detachment of the natural 
active memberships of different quality appears more sharply than in the chains, in 
which prevail the standards and the rules, inherited in the essence even from the Soviet 
time.  
For example, in the forest chain, until now, are not specified the competences of 
particular owner, are not separated the regulated and economic authorities of the forest 
service of Russia, which prevents the technologically already prepared and 
economically justified passage from the continuous to the more efficient selested style 
of logging. In the petroleum chain the presence in one pipe of oil of different quality no longer satisfies its new owners and is produced a change in the contracting, to ensure 
its differentiation and to decrease the expenses of quality control.  
The problem of the differentiation of fine-wooled and coarse wool sheep acquired 
the contract economic nature: insufficient specification increases the expenses of 
control (quality measurement of the obtained fur by its buyer) and increases the risk of 
the adverse selection of fur.The growing expenses of measurement cause the need for 
passage to the new contract between the producers and the processors. 
In the Soviet time stock-breeding work had technological value as the method of 
increasing the productivity of animals.Under the new conditions it is intended to improve 
the quality of information for the subjects of the market for sheep-breeding production 
and to decrease the risks of the adverse selection of animals (for example, the related 
pairing) for the sheep-breeding farm- buyers. 
Thus, in many regions of the functioning of different resource chains we observe 
in the essence the processes of one nature: the high expenses of not strictly 
established resources of different quality and significant efforts/forces on the formation 
of new institutions (standards, rules, the framework and special s tructures), which 
ensure the clearness of differentiation and schemes of the rights of property.  